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Lilly Stockton owner of Just Cookies is currently under
investigation to determine whether her cookie stand violated an
Indianapolis anti-discrimination ordinance for declining to fill a
special rainbow-colored cupcakes order for a student group's
"National Coming Out Day" celebration.' If found guilty, the
business could be fined under the ordinance.2 Mrs. Stockton
suggested to a news reporter that she had no idea what the
cupcakes were for, saying, "Look around, we don't have
cupcakes" 3-which is presumably why her stand is called "Just
Cookies." Furthermore, Mrs. Stockton claimed the refusal was
not based on any opposition to the Coming Out Day celebration
because "[the buyer] didn't tell [her] what it was for" and an
order for rainbow cookies was not possible because she did not
"have enough colors to do that."' Her husband, however, told
reporters, "I explained that we're a family-run business, we have
two young, impressionable daughters and we thought maybe it
was best not to do that."'

t Myser Fellow, The Notre Dame Center for Ethics and Culture, University of
Notre Dame.
1 Scott Olson, Local Ordinance Could Be Key in City Market Discrimination
Flap, INDIANAPOLIS Bus. J. (Sept. 30, 2010), www.ibj.com/article/print?articleld
=22578.
2

See id.

Ray Cortopassi, Local Bakery Refuses To Make Rainbow Cupcakes for Gay
Customer, FOx 59 NEWS (Sept. 23, 2010), www.fox59.com/news/wxin-bakery-wontmake-rainbow-cupcakes-092310,0,6300849.story (internal quotation marks omitted).
4 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
' Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The Mayor's office has suggested that Just Cookies may lose
its lease in the city-run market to "make clear that everyone is
welcome in the Market.

...

The city owns the Market and we

don't want there to be a feeling that, because you have a certain
belief, you're not welcome."6 In further explaining why the
Mayor was considering evicting the cookie company from its
stand after more than twenty years in business, his spokesman
explained, "[t]he mayor was certainly dismayed and wants to
make it clear that a person's values, morality and personal
beliefs are absolutely not relevant to making a purchase at the
City Market."' In support of the Stocktons, Micah Clark, the
president of the American Family Association of Indiana, told
reporters that his organization was willing to provide legal
assistance to the owners of the cookie stand.' He said:
It's one thing if someone walks into a store and buys a cookie off
the shelf, but (the Stocktons) were being asked to become part of
the (National Coming Out Day) celebration. To make rainbow
cookies for a special event with which the company has a
disagreement-I think that goes beyond the pale of what we
should expect companies to do.9
Newspapers reported that the student group filled its order at
another local bakery, The Flying Cupcake,' 0 and that local gay
groups were planning a boycott of Just Cookies."
This controversy could be a case-study for the arguments
presented in Robert K. Vischer's new book Conscience and the
Common Good: Reclaiming the Space Between Person and

State.'" In the book, he suggests that the mayor of Indianapolis
has got it exactly wrong, that, in fact, a person's "values, morality
and personal beliefs" are and should be central to their activity in
the marketplace.13 Vischer addresses several questions similar to
6 Olson, supra note 1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Bill McCleery, City Market Vendor Could Lose Lease for Turning Away Gays,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR (Sept. 30, 2010), http://www.indy.com/posts/city-market-vendorcould-lose-lease-for-turning-away-gays (internal quotation marks omitted). In this
article, Mrs. Stockton is also quoted as saying that her cookie company does not take
special orders because they are too busy selling cookies at their stand. See id.
Id.
9 See id.
o See Olson, supra note 1.
n See McCleery, supra note 7.
12 ROBERT K. VISCHER, CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD: RECLAIMING THE
SPACE BETWEEN PERSON AND STATE (2010).

" See McCleery, supra note 7.
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those raised by the cupcake dispute. When should the state
intervene in disputes between citizens whose opposing moral
positions clash in the market place? Should a pharmacist have to
sell the morning-after pill, even if she believes doing so would
violate her duty to do no harm and implicate her in a serious
moral evil?14 Can a wedding photographer licitly refuse services
to a lesbian couple to avoid the appearance of moral approval of
same-sex marriage?15 Vischer argues that such disputes should
be left largely to the "moral marketplace" to sort out and that the
state should mainly abstain from taking sides."6 His central
thesis is that the common good and respect for conscience will
flourish where the state has minimal involvement in "culture
war" issues." The workings of the market, including private
organizing in support of, or in opposition to, various moral
causes, will provide "breathing space" for people to create
communities around shared values. The gay-friendly crowd will
head to The Flying Cupcake and the traditional morality crowd
will head to Just Cookies, and both sides will further flourish in
living out their shared ideals in "their own respective moral
communities.""
Similar market mechanisms will provide photographers for
gay wedding ceremonies and also permit those opposed to this
practice to continue to run their businesses for straight couples
only; "pro-morning-after pill" pharmacies will compete for moral
adherents with those opposed to the drug. The state will practice
restraint in refusing to take sides between the two contending
parties, minimizing its use of coercive power, and the market will
eventually create diverse and robust moral communities, coexisting and seeking to persuade others to join with them in
common cause.
But, what if Just Cookies is the only bakery in town? More
pointedly, what if Mom and Pop's drugstore, with a policy against
the morning-after pill, is the only. pharmacy in the community?
Or, say there are four drugstores and all of them are run by those
with objections to the morning-after pill? And what if those
seeking the drug have to drive two hours to get to the
14
1
1

See VISCHER, supra note 12, at 170.
See id. at 2.
See id. at 4-5.

17

See id. at 6-8.

1

See id. at 5.
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non-objecting pharmacy?
At some point, the difficulty or
inconvenience of getting access to the morning-after pill will be
so great that the drug is effectively "unavailable" to those who
want it. Now the state has an appropriate "market correcting"
role to play in this dispute, according to Vischer."
In sum, he argues that the state should pursue a policy that
aims at securing the minimum damage to freedom of conscience
that is compatible with the maximum achievement of individual
liberty to do, to buy, and to consume whatever is legally
This policy gives priority to the latter by its
permitted.
willingness to violate freedom of conscience if that is the only
way to secure individual liberty to do, buy, and consume.
Vischer's arbitrary prioritization of the consumer's liberty over
the provider's conscience is never directly justified, but he argues
that his approach is more fully compatible with both the common
good and a proper respect for conscience.
In practical terms, the state should have some kind of
mechanism for intervention upon a finding that there has been
such a "market failure," by which he seems to mean that
someone has been denied access to a desired, but morally
controversial, good or service.20 Under Vischer's proposal, it is
then proper for the state to coerce Mom and Pop-and perhaps
others in agreement with them-into selling the morning-after
pill, rainbow cupcakes, or photography services, either through a
licensing procedure or through the imposition of legal liability.
Vischer argues that this more limited market correcting role
represents the proper compromise between the contending
"culture war" positions. 2 1 He asserts that "winner take all" uses
of the coercive power of the state, such as uniform mandates to
businesses or uniform conscience protections of businesses, are
often unnecessary intrusions that fail to respect the proper
function of mediating social institutions and the need to create
marketplace communities with shared moral convictions.22 At
the same time, a complete refusal of the state to intervene on
behalf of those who cannot access morally disputed goods and
1

See id. at 172-73.

See, e.g., id. at 174-75 (describing "market failures" with respect to
pharmaceuticals).
20

2

See, e.g., id. at 176.

See, e.g., id. ("[T]he normative claims pursued by the government should not
impose particular substantive outcomes on the moral debate . . . but should be
geared toward facilitating participation within the market.").
22
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services would mean that many with opposing moral views would
not have the freedom to fully live out their shared moral
convictions in their own social settings.
However, Vischer's policy solution to this dilemma, the state
as a corrector of "market failures," seems to risk a slow-motion
descent into a widespread use of state coercion that he says will
undermine the common good and make it impossible for moral
communities to live out their share convictions in the
marketplace. I will focus only on this aspect of Vischer's workhis argument that the proper use of the coercive power of the
state should usually be limited to guaranteeing access to certain
goods and services and that this limited role is both necessary
and sufficient for the proper protection of the common good and
the freedom of conscience."
I should make it clear that this sub-topic about the proper
use of state coercive force is only one aspect of the whole of the
book, which focuses broadly on drawing out the implications of
what he calls the "relational dimension of conscience."2
Nevertheless, his policy proposal is an important practical
conclusion that flows from the book's broader discussion, and it is
at the heart of his answer to how to properly "reclaim the space"
between person and state in relation to "culture war" issues, in
which each side seeks to marshal the coercive force of the state to
defeat its opponents. I will not address the underlying theory
regarding the nature of the common good, nor the nature of
conscience, except as they are invoked to justify this limited state
"market access" guarantor role.
To explain my concerns with his conclusions, I will first set
out my understanding of Vischer's central policy proposal. He
suggests a system whereby the state is empowered to recognize
and correct certain kinds of "market failures" related to the
moral views of different segments of society.2 5 Vischer argues
that this role is not properly viewed as "taking sides" but rather
is simply ensuring that both sides of contested issues are

23 He believes that the costs of such restraint by the state are too high in the
areas of employment and housing discrimination and that a uniform antidiscrimination rule is necessary in these contexts. See id. at 27-28.
24 See id. at 8-11.
25 See, e.g., id. at 172 ("The state's primary role will be to address market
failure. As do traditional economic markets, markets composed of commercial firms
trafficking not just in goods and services, but also in moral claims, will also fail.").
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properly accommodated in civil society.26 In an illustrative case,
concerning how the state should handle disputes over access to
certain pharmaceuticals, Vischer says:
[T]he normative claims pursued by the government should not
impose particular substantive outcomes on the moral debatethe nonnegotiable sanctity of the pharmacist's conscience or the
nonnegotiable sanctity of consumer choice-but should be
geared toward facilitating participation within the market. The
state is a facilitator, not an arbiter.
. . . The normative claims to be pursued by the state as a
market actor thus boil down to questions of access. Whether to
remedy market failures or to overcome deliberately exclusionary
practices by key economic gatekeepers, the state's objective is
not to impose a certain vision of the good, but to promote the
public conversation(s) regarding the good.27
Of course, this position does in fact "impose a certain vision
of the good" and is not as morally neutral as suggested. This
proposed solution to the "culture war" does, however, highlight a
common move when a moral debate has reached a stalemate: the
search for neutral, quasi-procedural solutions to seemingly
intractable substantive disputes. Rather than deciding finally on
the normative answer to the question "which side is correct about
how we should live together," we search for a mechanism that
will allow us to sidestep the thornier question to achieve a kind of
ditente. The question I want to address is, would this
mechanism really lead to a ditente in which both sides of the
"culture war" can flourish side by side, as Vischer suggests.
Unfortunately, I believe his proposal would create several serious
risks to the rights of businesses and individuals to integrate their
professional lives with their conscientious beliefs.
Turning to these practical aspects of his policy proposal, I
first have to ask what is meant by the term "market failure" in
this context. It is not clear why one would conclude that an
inability of some people to access a desired good or service
amounts to a "market failure" requiring state intervention simply
because the unavailability is premised on a moral judgment of
the provider.

26 See,
27

e.g., id. at 176 ("The state is a facilitator, not an arbiter.").
Id. at 176.
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Many people, especially those in rural areas, have difficulty
accessing many kinds of goods and services for all kinds of
reasons, and no one argues that the state should intervene to
correct this problem. There must be something that sets apart
ordinary lack of access from this extraordinary lack of access
warranting the use of state coercive power, but the distinction is
not made explicit in Vischer's book. For instance, suppose the
only hardware store in my community refuses to sell vacuum
cleaners and there is no other source of them for miles and miles.
Perhaps the store owner does not want to waste space on a
product for which there is insufficient demand. Perhaps this lack
of demand is partly due to the fact that people in my community
do not like vacuum cleaners because they use too much electricity
or promote laziness or they want to support local broom makers
or because vacuum cleaners are not made in America. All of
these reasons reflect certain moral convictions that I may not
share, but if the owner of the hardware store and the majority of
my town are morally opposed to vacuums, then the unavailability
of the machine is a result of a properly working market and not a
failure at all. It might be very important to me to have a vacuum
cleaner for many reasons. I may have allergies or asthma that
will be exacerbated by my inability to vacuum my house, but I do
not believe that Vischer would argue that the state should
properly force my hardware store to offer to sell me one,
regardless of the reasons for failing to offer them.
The ambiguity about how a triggering "market failure" is to
be identified makes it difficult to properly assess Vischer's
proposal. What is it that distinguishes the kinds of "market
failure" that warrant state intervention? Vischer sometimes
suggests that the state will only ensure access to "essential"
goods or services, but nowhere does he define that term.28 Is a
vacuum cleaner an essential good? What about access to
abortion? Perhaps a "market failure" is a trigger because of the
prevalence of the debate, the identification with a broader
"culture war," or the wide-spread or serious inconvenience that
those denied access will experience-but each of these is part and
parcel of the underlying moral dispute. If it really is the case, for
instance that abortion is destructive and harmful to important
human goods, then none of these other factors-wide-spread
" See, e.g., id. at 306.
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debate, attention, inconvenience-will change an abortion into
something "essential." Indeed, from this perspective, it may
rather be that the true "market failure" lies in providing access to
such destructive services. Therefore, right at the start of his
policy proposal, Vischer requires the state to abandon its
supposed substantive neutrality in the "culture war" and to make
state coercive power operative on only one side of only some
disputable moral questions. Those with moral objections to other
kinds of goods and services will not likely face the stark
consequences of such a judgment.
A similar "market failure" analysis is required with regard to
certain deliberate exclusionary practices, which is the term
Vischer uses to discuss the discriminatory denial of goods or
services to a distinct class of people. Again, only certain kinds of
such discrimination will presumably count as triggering events.
Had a town's only available providers of cupcakes or photography
services declined to serve the local Tea Party movement, Earth
Day celebration, feminist rally, or atheist convention, would any
or all of these constitute a triggering market failure? Under
Vischer's proposal, each of these groups has an incentive to seek
to be brought into a system that gives them the potential to a
state-enforced right of access to goods and services. What is the
morally neutral principle determining which groups are worthy
of this use of state power?
Vischer does say that not every kind of exclusionary practice
or objectionable product or service will be made the subject of
the state's "market facilitating" function, but his list is
pretty expansive.
In addition to wedding photographers,"
we have arguable rights to government coercion to facilitate
our access to: taxi services at airports,ao adoption agencies, 3 '

See id. ("[I]f there are ten wedding photographers in Albuquerque willing to
a
shoot same-sex commitment ceremony, the justification for state action looks much
different than if the [objectors] are the only photographers in town.").
o See id. at 307 ("The limited marketplace encountered by a given passenger,
combined with the significant percentage of drivers in Minneapolis who object to
transporting alcohol, may warrant the airport commission's refusal to accommodate
29

drivers' consciences . . .).
3 See
id. at 150 ("Provided that birth parents were informed of the
organization's discriminatory policy, and that they could have chosen other agencies
that did not exclude same-sex couples, the state should have allowed the
marketplace to function.").
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voluntary
anti-depressants,
treatments,3 2
infertility
associations, particular educational programs in schools,35 legal
services, and more. Under Vischer's approach, the state in each
of these cases should conduct a factual inquiry into whether a
"consumer" has been deprived of some good or service based on a
provider's moral decisions and, if so, whether it should take
action.
Vischer argues, however, that under his proposed system,
many with moral objections to providing various goods and
services will remain free of state coercion and will be permitted
to continue to conduct their businesses in conformity with their
moral views. However, I find this assertion to be doubtful given
the many uncertainties and difficulties that businesses will face
under Vischer's proposed system.
Take, for instance, Vischer's example of a wedding
photographer who objects on moral grounds to accepting a job to
In the actual
photograph a same-sex commitment ceremony.
case, the photographer was sanctioned under the state's antidiscrimination statute for refusing the job based on objections to
homosexuality.39 But under Vischer's "market access" approach,
so long as the homosexual couple can access the goods or services
32 See id. at 306-07 ("Consider the ... lawsuit filed by Guadalupe Benitez
against a fertility clinic. . . . Ideally, the resolution of this conflict would not hinge on
elevating freedom or equality over the other, but on whether Benitez could obtain
those services elsewhere without incurring substantial hardship.").
" See id. at 161 (describing pharmacists' battle to have courts hold that they
should not be compelled to dispense certain medications including birth control pills
and antidepressants).
" See id. at 133-34 ("If the Jaycees functioned as a male-only business network
with significant market influence, the state would have a legitimate interest in
regulating the organization to promote women's access to economic opportunity.").
" See id. at 219 ("The marketplace analogy is limited here.... Nevertheless, the
state's focus remains the same [with respect to education] as in its regulation of
pharmacies or attorneys: ensuring access to the goods in question. When there is
only one pharmacy serving an area, the state may appropriately require a full range
of pharmaceuticals to be offered as a condition of licensing. When students lack any
choice in the educational marketplace, the state must ensure that they can receive a
full education at the school to which they are assigned.").
" Id. at 301 ("[Als long as a viable market for legal services exists, the lawyer's
adherence to her own conscience-informed professional boundaries does not threaten
the rule of law.").
" See, e.g., id. at 172-73 ("If moral discourse regarding controversial
pharmaceuticals is going to take place, we must discern between market-driven
inconvenience and market-driven lack of access.").
* See id. at 2-5.
* See id. at 2.
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elsewhere in the community, the wedding photographer will face
no legal liability.40 At the same time, the homosexual community
is free to organize boycotts or other private protests against such
businesses. The wedding photographer is also free to seek to
build up a client base of like-minded customers who wish to
support the construction of a market for others who share the
photographer's moral disapproval of homosexual unions.
Vischer acknowledges that there will be administrative
difficulties in applying his "market access" rule but sets forth
some suggestions about how such a mechanism could work. For
instance, some market actors are already licensed by the local
government, and a business that wishes to refuse certain goods
or services as a whole or with respect to a certain class could be
required as a condition of licensing to demonstrate that there are
alternative sources available in the community that have no such
access restrictions. 4 ' For non-licensed businesses, the state could
provide a "market-access" defense to a discrimination lawsuit,
providing that no liability will be found so long as the business
can demonstrate that there are other sources in the community
where the goods or services are available without the moral
restrictions.4 2
In practice, however, this system is still stacked against
Put yourself in the shoes of the
the objecting providers.
wedding photographer who will face legal liability if he refuses a
job on moral grounds and the customer cannot access the
services elsewhere. The first problem for the photographer is
uncertainty. As Vischer acknowledges, "availability" and "in the
community" are relative terms that, given the deep commitment
on both sides of disputed moral claims, will be hard fought over.4 '
But, even a clear definition of the geographical limits of a
community will not resolve the uncertainty. Suppose there are
four possible services within the county, two of which are already
booked for the date sought and one of which offers poor quality
work. Under these circumstances, would the "market access"
40See id. at 5 ("Assuming that other wedding photographers are willing and able
to shoot a same-sex commitment ceremony, the state should leave the
[photographers who objected] to answer to the consumer, not the state, and allow
consumers to utilize market power to contest (or embrace) the moral norms of their
choosing.").
See id. at 306.
42
13

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id. at 306-07.
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defense be available? Market participants are constantly in flux,
with service providers coming and going both permanently and
temporarily for a vacation or sick leave.
How will the
photographer know for certain whether there is an alternative
available and how much effort must he put forth in making the
determination?
It is also not impossible to imagine his
competitors making life difficult for the objecting photographer
by routinely claiming they are unavailable for jobs, adding
another layer of complexity to this system.
Indeed, making one person's legal liability-that of the
objecting business-turn on the actions of others-competing
businesses that are "unavailable" for any "non-moral" reason
seems to run counter to our notions of fair play and due process.
At the least, there would be a question as to whether such a
system of liability provides adequate notice to the objecting
photographer about how to conform to the law. I believe there is
a colorable argument that the "access defense" to a state
mandate could be found unconstitutional on these grounds. That
would leave the licensing option still in place, but such a system
would create a more expensive, complex, and intrusive
governmental role, especially since there appears to be no limit to
the kinds of issues that could be made subject to this guaranteed
access scheme.
The concerns over state intrusiveness and due process will
be all the more unmanageable when one factors in the seemingly
unlimited kinds of morally disputed issues that would likely be
included in this "market access" liability scheme. For instance, I
would presume this access based liability would be invoked to
either impose liability or require trade unions to work on
building the so-called Ground Zero mosque in Manhattan if no
other workers would agree to work on the project." Suppose that
four different electrical wiring firms reject the job on moral
grounds. Are all four of them liable, even if only one of them is
needed to complete the job? What if the only hotel or cable
company in a town refuses to provide access to pornography on
moral grounds? Must Walmart stock adult sex toys if there is no
other access to these morally disputed items in a particular

" See generally Samuel Goldsmith, We Won't Build It! HardhatsSay No Way
They Will Work on WTC Mosque, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Aug. 20, 2010, at 6.
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community?4 5 How about a doctor refusing to prescribe medical
marijuana to those meeting statutory qualifications? Can a
home renovation service reject a job that does not meet its
"green" environmental standards? Must a hotel or resort agree
to offer accommodations to a "swinger's weekend" if there is no
other available site? Create your own scenarios for animal rights
activists, buy American campaigns, vegetarians, fair trade
activists, and any of dozens of other campaigns. While statutes
have in recent years added to the list of protected groups or
mandates of particular disputed goods and services, none are as
encompassing as Vischer's, which potentially includes the entire
universe of possible moral objections one might imagine.
Rejecting the claims of any of these groups would presumably
undermine the goal of government neutrality and equality of
concern that seems to be at the heart of Vischer's plan.
With an expanded list of moral objections in play and
presenting the possibility of invoking governmental assistance,
the number of possible conflicts increases as well. What if
several businesses object to providing services, but on different
moral grounds? For instance, an atheist photographer who will
not work at religious ceremonies, a Sabbath observer who will
not work on Saturdays, another objects because the couple is gay,
a fourth refuses jobs where alcohol is present, and a fifth objects
because she refuses to attend wedding receptions where meat is
served. Are all five of these photographers legally liable to the
customer? If the government is to remain morally neutral, and
perhaps avoid equal protection concerns, then presumably it is
not permissible to favor some moral objections over others,
meaning that all five must be treated the same. What about a
sixth photographer who refuses the job but will not say why?
Furthermore, such competing "moral communities," each with its
own criteria for objecting to acceptance of a job, increase the
uncertainties with regard to legal liability, and, therefore, the
pressure on an objector to abandon his or her principals.

11 Compare Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 747 (5th Cir. 2008)
(holding that a state ban on the promotion of sex toys to adults violates the
Fourteenth Amendment), with Williams v. Morgan, 478 F.3d 1316, 1323 (11th Cir.
2007) (upholding a ban on the sale of sex toys to adults against a Fourteenth
Amendment challenge).
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These factors would seem to combine to create a particular
challenge to those businesses located in smaller, rural, and more
homogenous areas of the country. It is likely that there are many
more competing businesses and service providers to choose from
in larger metropolitan areas, with the result that a few morally
objecting providers may well hope that a broader pool of
providers will shield their moral choices from liability.
Businesses located in smaller communities with fewer
competitors and more local agreement on moral issues will face
the highest risk of being required to violate their deeply held
moral convictions. It is fair to assume that many businesses in
such rural communities stay on because of their ties to the
community, rather than because of favorable market conditions.
The pressure on those with the strongest convictions and lowest
economic margins, therefore, will be to either move to more
populated areas or simply drop out of the market entirely, thus
risking the possibility that even fewer providers will remain to
offer goods and services to these rural communities. In their
place will come those without the distinctive moral commitments
that Vischer's proposal sought to protect.
This urban/rural split also seems to undermine the idea that
the hoped-for "moral marketplace" is one in which everyone is
equally free to seek to establish institutions that reflect and
support one's conscientious beliefs and persuade others to your
point of view. In areas where a community is relatively cohesive,
a few people will be empowered to bring the power of the state to
bear to require provision of morally contested goods and services,
with the objectors being either forced to change or driven to the
cities. There may be some irony here. Typically, those who
challenged the prevailing morality of a small cohesive community
were drawn to the city to find the freedom to live out their
"subversive" moral identity. Under Vischer's proposal, the
morally-objecting businesses are now the subversives, causing
market failures that require state intervention and facing the
prospect of moving to the big city in order continue to conduct
their businesses in accordance with their moral convictions. The
migration to the cities by conscientious objectors would be the
result of direct state coercion, a factor that will not foster
Vischer's goal of peaceful co-existence among the contending
sides.
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Relatedly, Vischer's access model seems to introduce a
perverse incentive to avoid persuading others to join in one's
"moral community" based on disputed moral claims. Vischer
urges both sides in the "culture war" to find "their
sustenance ... from targeting the hearts and minds of their
neighbors, joining together in common cause," 4 6 rather than by
trying to win blanket protections from the state. But this advice
is only helpful to those who want access to morally disputed
goods and services and not to those who object to providing them.
Under Vischer's system, a provider's freedom to morally object in
the marketplace is dependent on the existence of others who
disagree with those views and who are therefore willing to
provide the disputed goods or services. Being too persuasive in
encouraging others to adopt your moral views will thereby
increase the chances that you will be subject to legal liability for
adhering to those views. Therefore, a pharmacy that refuses to
dispense the morning-after pill will have every reason to avoid
encouraging other pharmacies to act accordingly. Such selfcensorship defeats the goal of encouraging a determined, openminded, and free discussion about competing moral visions of the
good.
Finally, given the virtually unbounded set of possible
morally-based market conflicts over goods or services that could
be considered essential, I find it puzzling that his book makes
only the slightest mention of how his system would apply to
abortion and other conflicts involving doctors and hospitals, a
subject Vischer covers in less than two full pages. Almost every
state has some version of a health care right of conscience
statute, setting forth legal protection for health care workers and
institutions with objections to providing morally controversial
services, particularly abortion. At the federal level, the Church
Amendment protects both health care institutions and individual
health care workers from discrimination for either providing
abortions or refusing to provide abortions.4 7 Vischer's book does
not mention these statutes, nor does he explain how his system
would resolve the growing list of potential bioethical conflicts.
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VISCHER, supra note 12, at 164.

See 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (2006).
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Vischer does suggest that a broader market analysis may
be important to such questions. For instance, he suggests that
forcing Catholic hospitals to do abortions might actually worsen
the health care market in a particular locality if these hospitals
are forced to close and no other hospitals are willing to take their
place. Therefore, it may not be wise for the state to enforce a
market access model in such cases. He does not explain what
should happen if another hospital willing to provide the services
offers to move into an area, but it would seem from his premises
that the state should then go ahead and fulfill its market access
function by mandating access to the service.
Given the
advantages of economies of scale and enlarging existing
networks, it is not impossible to imagine that some healthcare
corporations would be happy to take on the predatory role of
eliminating its competitors by hopping onto the "market access"
bandwagon.
Nor does Vischer discuss how to properly apply his model to
individual health care workers, such as doctors and nurses who
work in health care institutions that do provide abortions and
other contested services. Under current federal law, no health
care institution can discriminate in employment, privileges, or
promotion against a doctor who refuses to provide abortions nor
against a doctor who does perform abortions.4 9 This statute runs
counter to Vischer's argument that institutions must be free to
determine their own institutional moral identity and should not
be bound by law to accommodate employees with moral
objections undermining the institution's moral identity.so
While it is possible that federal law mandating some kinds of
religious accommodations to workers may offer some assistance
to such health care workers, this is a very thin reed when
compared to current federal law. Under both Title VII and the
recently proposed Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2010 (the
"WRFA"), an employer need not accommodate the worker if doing
so will present an "undue hardship" on the institution.'
In
practice, an undue hardship is usually economic in nature.
4
4

See VISCHER, supra note 12, at 177.
See 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7.

50 See, e.g., VISCHER, supra note 12, at chs. 6-7 (discussing the need to protect
a
corporation's right to define its own moral identity with regard to disputed moral
questions). Generally, the state should not intervene to protect employees who
disagree with these corporate judgments. See id. at 156, 201.
51 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j); S. 4046, 111th Cong. § 2 (2010).
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It is likely that a pro-choice hospital could refuse to
accommodate a pro-life doctor under these statutes. Given that
under Vischer's approach a potential patient can apparently
predicate legal liability on the institution for refusing the service
in some circumstances, it would seem likely that many hospitals
could rather easily demonstrate that accommodating pro-life
doctors and nurses creates the "undue hardship" of the threat of
legal liability. This economic burden would mean the institution
need not accommodate pro-life staff, particularly in rural areas
where staff shortages mean that others willing to do the
procedure are not available.
Notably, under Vischer's scheme, although pro-life doctors
would thus face permissible discrimination, it is arguable that a
pro-choice doctor would merit an accommodation that would
allow him to violate a pro-life hospital's policy against abortions.
If a doctor's religious beliefs require him to provide abortions in
some cases, a pro-life hospital would have to demonstrate that
employing him creates an "undue hardship"-on the hospital.
This pro-choice doctor is not creating the risk of liability to the
hospital that a pro-life doctor's refusal to participate in abortion
might, and thus the pro-life hospital could well be required to
accommodate the pro-choice doctor's beliefs.
Nor would Title VII or the WRFA offer any assistance to a
doctor with her own private practice who has moral objections to
providing certain services if those services are otherwise
"unavailable" in the community. This is obvious from Vischer's
discussion of the case of Guadalupe Benitez, an unmarried
woman who was denied fertility assistance by a clinic with moral
limits on those it would accept as patients.
If there is no viable marketplace for an essential good or service,
state intervention is appropriate. Consider the recent lawsuit
filed by Guadalupe Benitez against a fertility clinic near San
Diego and two of its physicians for refusing to provide
intrauterine fertilization because she was unmarried (according
to the doctors) or because she was a lesbian (according to
Benitez). Ideally, the resolution of this conflict would not hinge
on elevating freedom or equality over the other, but on whether
Benitez could obtain those services elsewhere without incurring
substantial hardship. (In that particular case, although there
are many reproductive specialists in San Diego who would have
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provided their services to Benitez, she alleges that the
defendant clinic was the only provider covered under her
employer's health insurance policy.) 52
There is nothing in Vischer's book to suggest that the proper
handling of this case would be different if the doctors had been
obstetricians and Benitez had requested an abortion. The
potential for moral conflicts in this area is endless. Say that a
clinic performing abortions refused to do sex-selection abortions,
but will do all others. 3 Or that a fertility clinic refuses to assist
a deaf lesbian couple's efforts to conceive only a deaf child. 54 Is it
appropriate for the government to intervene and require that
these services be made available? Nor does Vischer answer his
implicit question as to whether the service is "unavailable" by
reason of insurance coverage limitations, but it would appear
that he is suggesting that this is a relevant factor. This would
mean that pro-life physicians and institutions face another order
of magnitude of uncertainty with regard to potential liability,
further encouraging health care workers to abandon either their
scruples or their jobs even in larger markets like San Diego.
Because of the strong commitments on both sides of the
abortion issue, it seems likely that there would be a concerted
effort to bring "access challenges" wherever possible in order to
The
change the balance of power regarding this issue.
uncertainty over legal duties would then likely trickle down into
medical education, with added pressure for doctors to be trained
in all morally contested but lawful services, as they might one
day be required to provide those services.
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VISCHER, supra note 12, at 306-07 (citations omitted).

" See Douglas Almond & Lena Edlund, Son-Biased Sex Ratios in the 2000
United States Census, in 105 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
SCIENCES 5681, 5681-82 (2008), available at www.pnas.org/content/105/5681.full
(presenting evidence of sex selective abortions of female fetuses in the United States,
particularly involving parents from India, South Korea, and China).
" See Carina Dennis, Deaf by Design, 431 NATURE 894, 895 (2004) (discussing
the successful efforts one lesbian couple undertook to have a deaf child by finding a
sperm donor with a genetic predisposition to passing on the trait). This article also
reports on surveys showing preferences among the deaf for having deaf children,
including surveys suggesting some couples would consider aborting a non-deaf fetus.
See id. Finally, it reports that a third of American doctors would agree to perform
pre-implantation genetic diagnosis to assist such a couple in choosing a deaf child.
See id. at 896.
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Although he claims otherwise, Vischer's policy approach
pushes most strongly only in one direction, against those with
moral scruples to the provision of the widest possible set of
legally permissible goods and services. These providers all face
the possibility of state coercion under his plan, although the
requirement of various factual judgments by the state would
mean that the pressure will be felt in only a piecemeal fashion at
the outset. Notably, this approach also seems to ignore the
conscience beliefs of consumers on the "receiving end" of goods
and services who seek to retain services of those who are
committed to living out of an intentionally focused moral point of
views in the moral marketplace. This issue is probably more
pronounced in the health care area, where there are stark
disagreements about the morality of various conceptions of
"health."
Take a pro-life couple who believe it is their duty to find a
hospital and doctor who share their view that abortion cannot
properly be included in a sound definition of health care and that
they have a duty to avoid cooperation in such practices by
boycotting those who disagree. They might believe, for instance,
that patronizing a pro-choice doctor or hospital encourages the
practice of abortion by creating the misimpression that a pro-life
couple endorses the doctor's practices. They also might be less
likely to trust the advice of a doctor whose values diverge so
strongly from their own. Therefore, they seek out a pro-life
medical practice.
Now suppose the hospital has an additional licensing
requirement to demonstrate access to abortion services or that
the medical practice faces a suit for refusing to provide an
abortion. Assuming that the state agrees that abortion is an
"essential" service, at least as important as cab services from the
airport or wedding photography services, the state will have to
act to assure abortion services in the community. Thus, it is
likely that many hospitals and medical practices that refuse to do
abortions will face the loss of a license or face liability for failing
to provide abortion services to those seeking them.
Not only are the hospital, doctors, and staff potentially
burdened by such a mandate, but so is the pro-life couple who
seeks to participate in a "moral community" committed to
respecting the life of the unborn. Previously, they had access to a
medical service in line with their moral beliefs, but after the
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state mandate, they are required to participate in a "moral
The market access
community" with values they abhor.
approach creates an obvious hardship to the pro-life medical
community who will be forced into an insoluble moral dilemma.
But it will also mean that the pro-life couple is now the party
that must travel to the cities with enough moral diversity to
permit a pro-life hospital or medical practice to exist, even if-or
rather, especially if-the overwhelming majority of their rural
community wants to support a pro-life medical community.
Now let us say this pro-life couple lives in a community
where the only hospital providing delivery services also provides
abortions. I take it the couple would not have a parallel "lack of
access" claim requiring state intervention to assure access to a
pro-life obstetrics and gynaecology service? Or would they? If
not, then the pro-choice advocates would seemingly have a legal
mechanism for bringing the coercive power of the state to bear to
seek to end a pro-life hospital's policy, while the pro-life
community would have no grounds for objecting to an abortionproviding service.
I would predict that the outcome of this imbalance would be
a steady attrition of pro-life health care institutions outside of
cities with a morally diverse health care community. Small
towns and rural areas that cannot support more than one health
care institution would likely face state coercion to provide the full
range of morally contested practices, thus hobbling the
development of those mediating institutions that permit people
to live out their shared moral values, the central goal of Vischer's
policy proposal. If one factors in the insurance limitations that
appear to be a factor in whether a service is "unavailable," then
even urban hospitals may face pressure to abandon pro-life
policies.
The "culture war" has been raging for quite some time and
shows no sign of abating. I can appreciate the impulse that has
motivated Vischer to come up with a viable compromise that
would redirect the energies of the two sides to a more
constructive path and away from state-enforced winner-take-all
approaches. However, I fear his policy proposal would simply
create a unidirectional pressure that would eventually force out
of the market many providers whose moral convictions do not
permit them to offer certain morally contested goods and
services. Given the more diffuse nature of Vischer's approach,
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focusing on administrative mechanisms and discrete factual
inquiries, it will be more difficult to rally political support to
those who are being coerced to violate their convictions or forced
out of business.
Vischer's plan would also create a big incentive for groups to
harness the power of the state as market facilitator, depending
on how one defines the relevant "market failures" that trigger
this function. If the state is required to enter into all of the
moral disputes currently being waged in the marketplace, this
proposal could well result in a net increase in the use of state
coercive power, rather than the hoped for decrease. Finally, with
respect to the abortion controversy, Vischer's proposal would
replace existing strong conscience protections for health care
workers and institutions with a tenuous shield entirely
dependent on the availability of abortion providers in the
community. Rather than resulting in an even-handed ditente, I
fear that the state as market facilitator would simply facilitate
the slow motion disintegration of those whose moral convictions
require limitations on the kinds of goods and services they will
offer. In their place will come a set of institutions reflecting the
lowest common denominator, with no distinctive moral
convictions that might rock the boat.
Perhaps such an outcome is conducive to some people's
understanding of the common good, but it does not offer much
hope to those who seek to integrate their moral convictions into
their professional lives.

